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Comment Francis T. Lui
The Gordon-Li paper provides a stimulating and insightful analysis on
why certain perverse economic policies are adopted in developing coun-
tries. For instance, why do they adopt possibly harmful inﬂationary policy,
set up high tariﬀs, pursue state ownership of ﬁrms and banks, and tolerate
resource-wasting red tapes? In the literature, the rent-seeking approach, or
its variants, such as the political economy model advanced by Grossman
and Helpman (1994), can be used to address some of these issues. Interest
groups, who have diﬀerent degrees of political inﬂuences, can lobby the
government to choose policies in their favor. The outcomes are often un-
desirable from the perspective of eﬃcient allocation of resources.
The Gordon-Li paper proposes a competing hypothesis to the political
economy approach. It highlights the diﬃculties of tax collection in many
developing countries. The signiﬁcant transaction costs involved could in-
duce them to adopt various kinds of second or third best policies for mak-
ing tax collection more eﬀective.
According to Gordon and Li, their model can generate some outcomes
that are similar to those of Helpman and Grossman, but there are also
sharply diﬀerent implications. The more important ones are as follows.
First, companies in capital-intensive industries are more likely to pay lower
taxes in the Grossman-Helpman model because they are lobbyists that 
are more powerful. On the other hand, in the Gordon-Li model, they are
viewed as those that cannot escape from the tax agencies and therefore are
forced to pay more. Second, Gordon and Li believe that the Grossman-
Helpman model is not able to explain why governments, especially those in
developing countries, adopt inﬂationary policies. But in the Gordon-Li
model, this is taken as a convenient means for governments that lack eﬀec-
tive tax agencies to collect revenues. Third, Gordon and Li believe that the
Grossman-Helpman model cannot explain why red tape exists. The former
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opment at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.regard red tape as a means for the government to deter otherwise tax-
paying ﬁrms to escape into an informal sector, where ﬁrms can avoid tax
payments more easily.
It is not clear that the two approaches are fundamentally inconsistent.
Once we generalize the Grossman-Helpman model by treating branches of
the government as interest groups themselves, the phenomena outlined
previously can also be accounted for.
Take the example of red tape. Can its existence not be derived from a po-
litical economy model? In the literature on corruption, red tape is often
treated as an instrument through which corrupt government oﬃcials can
make proﬁts. Bureaucrats themselves can be powerful lobbyists within the
government who want to protect their own interests. This can be done by
creating and maintaining red tape that strengthens and justiﬁes the au-
thorities it possesses.
In the Gordon-Li model, red tape is targeted on ﬁrms that want to go
into the informal sector. This may not always be the case. If a ﬁrm wants to
hide itself in the informal sector, possibly illegally, why should it bother
with the red tape?
I do not see why inﬂationary policy is incompatible with the political
economy approach. Government branches need revenue. If they saw that
inﬂationary tax is eﬀective in protecting their interests, they would sup-
port the policy. For instance, in the 1980s, many state-owned enterprises
in China tried hard to expand their sizes, but that would require more ex-
penditure. This eventually induced them to force the government to print
more money. Thus, inﬂation could also be the result of a political econ-
omy model.
The paper has ranked tax revenue as share of GDP according to the ide-
ological inclination of the country, and has found no obvious relationship
between the two. This is regarded as a refutation of the political economy
model because countries with diﬀerent ideologies may face diﬀerent polit-
ical pressures. However, one can legitimately ask how ideology is to be
measured. For instance, if we deﬁne left-wing government as one that fa-
vors larger government spending, there will necessarily be a relationship
between revenue collected and the ideology of the government.
The paper argues that improvement in the ﬁnancial sector may attract
low-quality ﬁrms to reenter the formal sector. They could be new competi-
tors for loans and credits. High-quality ﬁrms would ﬁnd it less attractive to
stay in the formal sector. These ﬁrms might leave, resulting in lower tax rev-
enue for the government. It would be strange if this happened. If low eﬃ-
ciency ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to stay, why would good ﬁrms be forced to
leave?
In short, the Gordon-Li and Grossman-Helpman models are not sub-
stitutes for each other. It makes more sense if we regard them as comple-
mentary.
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Comment Michael M. Alba
Summary
Why are economic conditions—obviously beside the deﬁnitional divide
in incomes and living standards—so diﬀerent between rich and poor coun-
tries? In developing economies, why are inﬂation and tariﬀ rates higher,
property rights and the rule of law not well established, red tape rife, and
corruption endemic? Why are government-owned or controlled ﬁrms—
particularly banks—so ubiquitous, tax evasion so pervasive, and the tax
base so narrow? In contrast to the political economy literature, which
points to government capture by politically powerful groups as the source
of these perverse outcomes, Gordon and Li (2005a, 2005b) hypothesize
that the culprit is a developing-country government’s limited capability to
enforce tax laws, due, on the one hand, to informational and monitoring
constraints when ﬁrms transact business on a cash basis, thus leaving no
record, and, on the other hand, to the low and variable productivity gains
that ﬁrms obtain when using the ﬁnancial sector, thus providing them little
incentive to switch from the tax-evading informal sector to the tax-paying
formal sector. Accordingly, ﬁrms that cannot do without the ﬁnancial sec-
tor, such as the large or capital-intensive ones, are those that are most
highly taxed and that constitute the narrow tax base. In a second-order re-
sponse, the government then acts to reduce the burden on these ﬁrms by
providing tariﬀprotection, rationing credit, and subsidizing loans (thus ex-
plaining government ownership of banks); at the same time, it can increase
the costs of informal sector ﬁrms by using inﬂation as a tax on cash hold-
ings and by imposing red tape, regulatory barriers to entry, and other non-
tax costs. As an extreme measure, the government may even opt for con-
trol of capital-intensive ﬁrms to ensure that, although heavily taxed, these
ﬁrms continue to operate at the appropriate scale and capital intensity.
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